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An encephalitis outbreak was investigated in Faridpur 
District, Bangladesh, in April–May 2004 to determine the 
cause of the outbreak and risk factors for disease. Biologic 
specimens were tested for Nipah virus. Surfaces were eval-
uated for Nipah virus contamination by using reverse tran-
scription–PCR (RT-PCR). Thirty-six cases of Nipah virus 
illness were identiﬁ  ed; 75% of case-patients died. Multiple 
peaks of illness occurred, and 33 case-patients had close 
contact with another Nipah virus patient before their illness. 
Results from a case-control study showed that contact with 
1 patient carried the highest risk for infection (odds ratio 
6.7, 95% conﬁ  dence interval 2.9–16.8, p<0.001). RT-PCR 
testing of environmental samples conﬁ   rmed Nipah virus 
contamination of hospital surfaces. This investigation pro-
vides evidence for person-to-person transmission of Nipah 
virus. Capacity for person-to-person transmission increases 
the potential for wider spread of this highly lethal pathogen 
and highlights the need for infection control strategies for 
resource-poor settings.
N
ipah virus was ﬁ  rst identiﬁ  ed as the pathogen respon-
sible for outbreaks of encephalitis in Malaysia and 
Singapore from October 1998 to June 1999 (1–6). Fever 
(97%), headache (61%), and reduced consciousness (55%) 
were the most common symptoms in Malaysia; case-fatal-
ity rate was 40% (7). Most case-patients lived on pig farms 
(95% in Malaysia) (1) or worked in abattoirs (100% in 
Singapore) (4,8). Serologic and reverse transcription–PCR 
(RT-PCR) testing of blood and urine from pteropid fruit 
bats in Malaysia and Cambodia showed Nipah virus infec-
tion, which suggested that these animals were reservoir 
hosts (9–11). During this outbreak, Nipah viruses were 
also isolated from human respiratory secretions and urine 
(2); however, 2 studies did not ﬁ  nd evidence of nosocomial 
transmission (12,13).
Subsequent investigations in India and Bangladesh 
have suggested that Nipah virus may have been transmitted 
from person to person. During an outbreak in Siliguri, In-
dia, in 2001, 45 (75%) of 60 patients, many of them health-
care workers, had a history of hospital exposure to patients 
infected with Nipah virus (14). A case-control study con-
ducted during an outbreak in Meherpur District, Bangla-
desh, in 2001 showed that persons who lived with or cared 
for patients during the patient’s illness were more likely 
to become infected with Nipah virus, and patients were 
more likely to have reported touching secretions of other 
patients; however, this ﬁ  nding could not be differentiated 
from common environmental exposures (15). During an 
outbreak in Rajbari District, Bangladesh, in January 2004, 
case-patients were more likely than controls to have had 
contact with another patient with Nipah virus illness (16). 
Pteropid bats were also suspected to be the reservoir for the 
virus in Bangladesh (9–11,15).
On April 5, 2004, the ICDDR,B and the Institute for 
Epidemiology and Disease Control Research were alerted 
to a cluster of 5 persons with fever, headache, confusion, 
and loss of consciousness in Faridpur District, in western 
Bangladesh. Nipah virus was the suspected cause of the 
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outbreak and an investigation began on April 6, 2004. In-
vestigation goals were to identify a reservoir host(s), deﬁ  ne 
the magnitude of the epidemic, and determine the princi-
pal modes of transmission. This report addresses the last 
2 goals.
Methods
Finding and Deﬁ  ning Cases
We deﬁ  ned suspected case-patients with Nipah virus 
illness as persons with fever and altered mental status (se-
rious illness) residing or working in the outbreak area or 
persons who had fever and cough or headache (mild ill-
ness) and who were contacts of patients with Nipah virus 
infection or resided in the outbreak area. Suspected case-
patients were identiﬁ  ed by visiting area hospitals, conduct-
ing door-to-door visits to all homes in the affected area, 
and tracing contacts of patients with Nipah virus illness. A 
history of illness and general information about exposures 
were obtained for each suspected case-patient. Friends and 
relatives of deceased case-patients served as proxy infor-
mants for interviews, and guardians were included in in-
terviews of children <13 years of age. All those who died 
in the outbreak areas during this time were considered sus-
pected case-patients.
A probable case-patient was deﬁ  ned as a patient with 
fever and mental status changes who lived or worked in the 
same village as a conﬁ  rmed case-patient and from whom 
either serum or cerebrospinal ﬂ  uid (CSF) was not available 
(i.e., because the patient died before specimen could be col-
lected) or from whom a negative result was obtained from a 
sample collected <10 days after illness onset but collection 
of subsequent specimens was impossible (17). A labora-
tory-conﬁ  rmed case of Nipah virus infection was deﬁ  ned 
by evidence of acute infection shown by immunoglobulin 
M (IgM) to Nipah virus in serum or CSF. To evaluate the 
possibility of asymptomatic infections, we asked persons 
with a history of close contact with a patient with Nipah 
virus–like illness to provide a blood specimen for serologic 
testing (7,13).
Specimen Collection and Laboratory Testing
Acute-phase blood specimens, throat swabs, saliva, 
and urine were collected from persons with suspected cas-
es. When possible, hospitalized patients underwent lumbar 
puncture and chest radiography. Convalescent-phase blood 
specimens were collected from all persons with suspected 
cases >10 days after illness onset. Acute- and convalescent-
phase serum and CSF were tested with an IgM capture en-
zyme immunoassay (EIA) for IgM and an indirect EIA for 
IgG by using Nipah virus (Malaysian prototype) antigen 
S (18) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. Acute-phase serum, CSF, throat 
swabs, saliva, and urine were also tested by RT-PCR for 
viral RNA. RNA was extracted from specimens by using 
the acid guanidinium–phenol method (19). RT-PCR was 
performed by using a primer set to detect the nucleocap-
sid gene as described (20), the Superscript One Step RT-
PCR Kit (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, USA), and standard 
reaction conditions (21). Primers used were NVNF-4: 5′-
GGA GTT ATC AAT CTA AGT TAG-3′ and NVNBR4: 
5′-CAT AGA GAT GAG TGT AAA AGC-3′. PCR prod-
ucts were subjected to electrophoresis on 2% agarose gels 
and visualized by staining with ethidium bromide. Positive 
PCR results were conﬁ  rmed by sequence analysis of PCR 
products.
Case–Control Study
We conducted a case–control study to identify risk 
factors for transmission of Nipah virus infection. Persons 
meeting either the probable or conﬁ  rmed case deﬁ  nition 
were enrolled as case-patients. All healthy persons includ-
ing household members and neighbors (residing within 150 
m of a case household), were eligible for participation as 
control participants. Controls were randomly selected from 
a list of names generated by a census of all households in the 
affected community and matched to a case-patient (6:1) by 
sex and age (± 2 years; all case-patients and controls were 
>4 years of age). They were given a 2-part questionnaire in 
Bengali. The ﬁ  rst part focused on environmental exposures 
and established whether the participant had had contact 
with a speciﬁ  c probable or conﬁ  rmed case-patient(s). The 
second part focused on types of contact with speciﬁ  c case-
patients to elucidate possible modes of transmission from 
person to person. Proxy interviews were conducted with 
guardians and companions for case-patients who had died 
or who were unable to respond and for all case-patients and 
controls <13 years of age.
We calculated odds ratios (ORs) and 95% conﬁ  dence 
intervals (CIs) by using conditional univariate logistic re-
gression that accounted for matched enrollment of case-
patients and controls (22). To evaluate independent risk 
factors, we tested all variables with a p value <0.1 from 
univariate analyses in conditional stepwise forward mul-
tivariate logistic regression. Associations were considered 
statistically signiﬁ  cant if p value was <0.05. All statistical 
analyses were performed with SAS version 9.0 (SAS Insti-
tute Inc., Cary, NC, USA).
Environmental Study
In early May 2004, 5 weeks after the outbreak was ﬁ  rst 
recognized, environmental surfaces believed to have a high 
risk for contamination with Nipah virus were selected for 
sampling. These included surfaces within hospitals where 
Nipah virus patients received care, surfaces within homes 
of conﬁ  rmed case-patients, trees where bats foraged, date Person-to-Person Transmission of Nipah Virus
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palm sap collection pots, and fruits that may have been in 
contact with fruit bats. Surfaces were rolled with sterile, 
cotton-tipped applicators, which were stored in 500 μL 
Dulbecco modiﬁ  ed Eagle medium supplemented with an 
antibiotic-antimycotic solution. Viral RNA was extracted 
from 140 μL of the resulting suspension by using a Viral 
RNA Minikit (QIAGEN, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada) 
and eluted in a volume of 50 μL. Nipah virus RNA was 
detected by using the LightCycler RNA Ampliﬁ  cation Kit 
SYBR Green I (Roche, Laval, Quebec, Canada) with prim-
ers for the nucleoprotein gene (NPF: 5′-ATCAATCGTG-
GTTATCTTGAAC-3′ and NPR: 5′CCTCTTCGTCGA-
CATCTTGATC-3′) and with thermocycling and real-time 
detection performed on a SmartCycler II reaction block 
(Cepheid, Sunnyvale, CA, USA). Positive results were 
later conﬁ  rmed by direct sequencing of ampliﬁ  ed products, 
and sequences were compared with those obtained from 
patient samples (23).
Participants and Ethical Considerations
Because this was an outbreak investigation, protocols 
did not undergo formal institutional review. The Bangla-
desh Ministry of Health and Family Welfare requested 
this investigation and reviewed and approved all proto-
cols. Participation in these studies was strictly voluntary 
and informed consent was obtained from all participants; 
for those <18 years of age, individual and parental consent 
were obtained.
Results 
Deﬁ  ning Cases
We identiﬁ  ed and collected specimens from 210 sus-
pected case-patients, of whom 32 had fever and altered 
mental status. Thirty-six case-patients were identiﬁ  ed, in-
cluding 4 who had a febrile illness without altered mental 
status. Twenty-three (64%) were laboratory conﬁ  rmed and 
13 (36%) were classiﬁ  ed as probable; 27 (75%) died. Se-
rum specimens were available from 27 of 36 case-patients, 
4 of which had no detectable antibodies to Nipah virus. 
These specimens were collected <6 days after illness on-
set. All 4 patients died before a second specimen could be 
obtained; therefore, they were classiﬁ  ed as probable case-
patients. Nine patients who had encephalitis-like illnesses 
and who resided in the outbreak area died before diagnostic 
specimens could be collected; they were also classiﬁ  ed as 
probable case-patients. No asymptomatic cases of Nipah 
virus infection were documented in contacts of Nipah virus 
patients who consented to provide a blood specimen (n = 
20). Results of sequencing RT-PCR products from throat 
swab, saliva, and urine samples of 9 patients were consis-
tent with serologic data, which indicated that Nipah virus 
was the etiologic agent of this outbreak (23).
Contact Tracing
Probable and conﬁ  rmed case-patients were identiﬁ  ed 
in 7 villages in Faridpur District; dates of onset of illness 
ranged from February 19 to April 17, 2004 (Figure 1). Thir-
ty-three (92%) of the 36 case-patients had had close contact 
with another ill person before they became ill  (Figure 2). 
Five cases (patients A, B, F, G, and EE) appeared to be 
associated with secondary and tertiary person-to-person 
transmission of Nipah virus. We present some examples 
of close contact.
Four of Patient A’s caregivers who resided in his vil-
lage became ill after their contact with him; they were his 
mother (patient D), his son (patient E), his aunt (patient B), 
and a neighbor (patient C). They became ill 15–27 days 
after patient A became ill. Patient B received care from her 
brother (patient F), who lived in a village ≈30 minutes from 
her village and who became ill 13 days after patient B. 
Patient F became ill after he had returned to his village. 
As shown in Figure 2, 22 (61%) of 36 cases in this outbreak 
had contact with patient F before they became ill. Patient 
F was a local religious leader. Many persons in his fam-
ily and his followers had close contact with him during his 
illness. Eight (80%) members of his 10-person household 
became infected with Nipah virus 6–13 days after his ill-
ness onset. Two of patient F’s brothers (patients T and U), 
both of whom lived ≈2 hours away, visited him for 6 hours 
on the day he died. They developed serious illness 7 (pa-
tient T) and 11 days (patient U) days later, and both died. 
Patients Y (patient F’s daughter) and Z (patient F’s son-in-
law), who lived 1 hour away from patient F, became ill ≈1 
week after 1 multiple-hour visit with patient F late during 
his illness; this was their only reported contact with a Nipah 
virus patient. In 11 other close contacts of patient F, includ-
ing family and religious followers, Nipah virus infection 
developed 6–14 days after his illness onset.
Patient G, a follower of patient F, moved to his fam-
ily’s house in an adjacent village to receive care after be-
coming ill. Patient H became ill ≈9 days after physically 
supporting patient G while walking to patient G’s fami-
ly’s house. A rickshaw driver, patient I, who helped carry 
Figure 1. Dates of illness onset during a Nipah virus outbreak in 
Faridpur District, Bangladesh, 2004.RESEARCH
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and transport patient G to the hospital as his condition 
deteriorated, became sick 10 days after this exposure and 
later died. Patient G’s father (patient J) and sister-in law 
(patient K) cared for him during his illness; both became 
severely ill 2 weeks after patient G’s illness onset; only 
patient K survived.
Patient GG visited his wife and daughter, both hos-
pitalized as suspected Nipah virus patients, at the local 
healthcare facility. Patient GG spent the night in the hos-
pital and shared a bed with patient EE (a common practice 
in Bangladesh), who was a male friend, and a suspected 
Nipah virus case-patient. Although tests on patient GG’s 
wife and daughter did not detect Nipah virus infection, pa-
tient EE’s infection was laboratory conﬁ  rmed. Patient GG 
became ill 10 days after this contact and died.
Patients II and KK had no known contact with any 
ill patient before their illness and were distinct from other 
case-patients in that they were not friends, relatives, or fol-
lowers of patient F and lived outside the affected villages. 
No cases of Nipah virus illness among healthcare workers 
were reported to authorities during this outbreak.
Case–Control Study
Thirty-four of the 36 case-patients were enrolled in the 
study and matched to 6 controls each (n = 204) by age and 
sex (Table). Two case-patients (patients JJ and KK; Fig-
ure 2) were not included in the study because of logistic 
constraints. Patient JJ was away from her home when the 
questionnaire was administered. Patient KK was a police-
man who had 2 residences and traveled frequently while 
on duty; we were therefore unable to identify appropriate 
proxies for his interview. 
Ten variables were signiﬁ  cantly associated with Nipah 
virus infection in univariate analysis (online  Appendix Ta-
ble 1, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/content/13/7/1031-
appT1.htm). Having had close contact (touching or receiv-
ing a cough or sneeze in the face) with patient F placed a 
person at greatest risk of acquiring Nipah virus infection 
(OR 6.7, 95% CI 2.9–16.8, p<0.001). Having had any con-
tact with someone who later died, had a fever, was uncon-
scious, or had respiratory difﬁ  culties was also associated 
with illness. Having avoided any contact with someone 
who later died was negatively associated with illness. Hav-
ing had a household member harvest date palm sap was the 
only environmental exposure associated with an increased 
risk for infection. Having visited the home village of the 
index case-patient was also associated with illness. Howev-
er, the only exposure variable that remained signiﬁ  cant in 
multivariate analysis was having had contact with patient F 
(OR 5.6, 95% CI 1.79–17.24, p = 0.003).
Univariate analysis of risk factors speciﬁ  cally associ-
ated with types of contact with patient F was conducted. 
Fourteen of 42 exposure variables were associated with ill-
ness (online Appendix Table 2, available from www.cdc.
gov/EID/content/13/7/1031  -appT2.htm). Having had close 
body contact and having spent longer periods of time with 
patient F were associated with illness. Having kept a cer-
tain distance from patient F and having washed hands after 
contact with him were negatively associated with illness 
(online Appendix Table 2). Despite multivariate analysis 
of risk factors associated with type of contact with patient 
F, insufﬁ  cient sample size (n = 50) resulted in overﬁ  tting of 
the model and spurious results.
Environmental Study
A total of 468 environmental specimens were collected 
by swabbing; 137 from walls, bed frames, mattresses, and 
ﬂ  oors of 2 Faridpur hospitals; 57 from surfaces and uten-
sils of case-patient residences; 150 from trees where bats 
forage and from fruits; 98 from bat excreta; and 26 from 
other sites. Eleven positive specimens were collected from 
Table. Characteristics of 34 case-patients infected with Nipah 
virus in case–control study, Bangladesh, April–May 2004 
Characteristic No. (%) case-patients 
Sex 
 Male  20  (58.8) 
 Female  14  (41.2) 
Age group, y 
 1–15  4  (11.8) 
 16–24  1  (2.9) 
 25–40  19  (55.9) 
 41–60  9  (26.5) 
 >60  1  (2.9) 
Adults vs. children 
<15 y of age (children)  4 (11.8) 
  >15 y of age (adults)  30 (88.2) 
Figure 2. Chain of person-to-person transmission with dates of 
onset of illness during a Nipah virus outbreak, Faridpur District, 
Bangladesh, 2004. Letters identify individual patients. Patients KK 
and II had no known contact with any ill patient before their illness.Person-to-Person Transmission of Nipah Virus
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the surrounding wall and bed frame where a conﬁ  rmed 
case-patient (patient Z) had been hospitalized on April 6, 
≈5 weeks before environmental samples were collected. 
No other patients with encephalitis were known to have 
used that bed after patient Z’s hospitalization. The wall and 
bed frame were visibly soiled, and hospital staff reported 
that they had not been cleaned since the outbreak. Samples 
from these areas showed evidence of Nipah virus RNA. 
Sequences of PCR products were identical to sequences of 
Nipah viruses isolated from patient HH during the outbreak 
(18). No samples from case-patient residences, bat-feeding 
sites, or fruits were positive.
Discussion
This investigation provides compelling evidence for 
person-to-person transmission of Nipah virus. Exposure 
histories of infected patients and the epidemiologic curve, 
which demonstrates multiple peaks of illness onset dur-
ing this outbreak, suggest that Nipah virus was transmitted 
by person-to-person contact. Contact tracing documented 
Nipah virus illness after brief, yet close contact, with oth-
er persons infected with Nipah virus. Findings from the 
case-control study, which showed a 6-fold increased risk 
for infection for those who reported contact with patient 
F, a negative association with illness after handwashing, 
and speciﬁ  c exposures to ill persons linked to transmission, 
conﬁ  rm that exposure to ill persons spread the outbreak.
Person-to-person transmission of Nipah virus is bio-
logically plausible. Other paramyxoviruses that infect hu-
mans, including human parainﬂ  uenza viruses 1–4, measles 
virus, and mumps virus, are also transmitted from person to 
person. Nipah virus has been isolated from human respira-
tory secretions, including those of cases from this outbreak 
(2,23). Furthermore, we identiﬁ  ed that direct exposure to 
respiratory secretions of patients with Nipah virus illness 
was associated with infection during this outbreak.
The number of villages affected by the outbreak in-
creased as persons traveled in and out of the affected ar-
eas to visit family members. This movement led to new 
infections in caregivers from other villages and increased 
the number of villages affected. Similar to transmission of 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (24), transmission of 
Nipah virus infection was not associated with all case-pa-
tients; however, 1 case-patient, patient F, was associated 
with 22 subsequent Nipah virus infections. Although host 
biologic factors may have resulted in increased viral shed-
ding, leading to higher attack rates, the social status of pa-
tient F in the community enabled closer contact with more 
persons during his illness and more opportunity to transmit 
infection.
During the outbreak in Siliguri, India, 33 healthcare 
workers and hospital visitors became ill after exposure to 
hospitalized patients with Nipah virus illness, suggesting 
nosocomial infection (14). In Malaysia and Singapore, 
contact with pigs was associated with infection; healthcare 
worker studies showed that the risk for nosocomial trans-
mission was low (6,8,12,13,25). Absence of person-to-per-
son transmission in Malaysia and Singapore could be due 
to differences in patient care practices, host susceptibility 
factors, or strain variation (23).
Detection of Nipah virus RNA on hospital surfaces 
demonstrates that infected patients shed virus into the en-
vironment, which could provide an opportunity to transmit 
Nipah virus to others. However, how long the virus will 
remain infectious in the environment is not known, and no 
evidence from this investigation indicates that type of trans-
mission occurred. Despite the absence of healthcare worker 
infection during this outbreak, enhanced infection control 
practices, such as patient isolation and use of gloves and 
masks, likely had little protective effect because they were 
not implemented until late in the outbreak. This outbreak 
provides evidence that 1 person (patient GG) was infected 
during a hospital visit while sharing a bed with a conﬁ  rmed 
case-patient. Nosocomial transmission of Nipah virus was 
reported during the outbreak in Siliguri, India (14). Efforts 
are needed to develop and disseminate reasonable guide-
lines for infection control and prevention for healthcare 
facilities and communities in resource-poor settings, es-
pecially when one considers our ﬁ  nding that handwashing 
prevents disease transmission.
Transmission of Nipah viruses to humans during this 
outbreak appears to have been bimodal. Fruit bats contin-
ue to be the only identiﬁ  ed primary reservoir for the virus 
(9–11,15). In contrast with the Malaysia and Singapore 
experience, no intermediate hosts have been identiﬁ  ed in 
Bangladesh (15). During this outbreak, the introduction 
of virus into human(s) from an unknown initial source ap-
pears to have been followed by person-to-person transmis-
sion. Three case-patients had no known contact with a sick 
patient before onset of illness; these case-patients may have 
been infected through exposure to virus-contaminated bat 
saliva, urine, or feces or through contact with some un-
known intermediate host. These cases provide further evi-
dence that sporadic cases of Nipah virus infection continue 
to occur in Bangladesh (26).
Selection of probable case-patients in this study could 
have been biased toward ﬁ  nding person-to-person transmis-
sion because probable case-patients by deﬁ  nition lived in 
the same area as conﬁ  rmed case-patients, which increased 
the likelihood that they had had contact with one another. 
To rule out the possibility that this had an effect on our 
case-control study ﬁ  ndings, we analyzed our data by using 
only conﬁ  rmed cases; there were no major differences in 
ﬁ  ndings compared with analysis that used conﬁ  rmed and 
probable cases. Our ﬁ  ndings are also limited by recall bias. 
Family and friends were often asked to provide information RESEARCH
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about a deceased patient weeks after their illness (data for 5 
patients were collected >1 month after illness onset). When 
possible, medical records were used to supplement patient 
reports of illness history, but often these records were in-
complete or nonexistent. However, the investigation began 
just days after onset of illness in most patients, which pro-
vided for optimal recall of events. In addition, case-patients 
or their proxies might have more carefully considered their 
exposures than controls. However, all community mem-
bers were aware of, and concerned by, the outbreak, and 
we believe it is unlikely that any control did not remember 
their exposure to case-patients in their community.
Capacity for person-to-person transmission increases 
the risk for wider spread of this highly lethal pathogen. 
In an impoverished, densely populated country such as 
Bangladesh, a lethal virus could rapidly spread before ef-
fective interventions are implemented. This spread would 
provide the seed for a substantial regional or global public 
health problem and highlights the need for local surveil-
lance, outbreak detection and response, and rapid labora-
tory diagnostics. Sustained, long-term research is needed to 
characterize the reservoir of the virus and mechanisms for 
animal-to-animal, animal-to-human, and human-to-human 
transmission; clarify climatologic and other environmen-
tal factors linked to transmission; and deﬁ  ne viral epitopes 
potentially linked to virulence and transmission. Effective 
infection control practices appropriate for resource-con-
strained healthcare systems and communities are urgently 
needed.
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